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Mike Bechthold 
Operation "Switchback" was conceived to capture the Breskens pocket and liberate 
the south bank of the Scheldt Estuary leading 
to Antwerp. As the Allies moved out of 
Normandy in the late summer of 1944, their 
pr imary supply line remained over the 
invasion beaches. The logistical situation 
became critical as the distance from the 
beachhead lengthened. The British scored a 
major coup in early September when they 
captured the port of Antwerp. Not only was 
this the largest port in Europe, it had been 
t a k e n wi th i ts por t facil i t ies in t ac t . 1 
Unfortunately, there remained one problem; 
Antwerp lay some 50 miles from the Sea. The 
only approach to the port lay along the Scheldt 
Estuary. The Germans controlled both banks 
of this channel and were determined to hold 
out to the last. Until the land on either side 
could be liberated, the port of Antwerp was 
useless to the Allies. 
"Switchback" opened on 6 October when 
the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade launched 
an assault across the Leopold Canal near 
Strooibrug. Though a foothold was achieved, 
it was tenuous at best. The pressure was 
relieved three days later when the 9th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade hopped across 
the Braakman Inlet in amphibious vehicles 
and landed on the eastern edge of the pocket. 
This put the Canadians behind the main line 
of German resistance and allowed the pocket 
to be slowly cleared from the east. The 
operation was planned to take a week, but 
took nearly a month. Operations in the 
pocket were not declared over unt i l 3 
November.2 
The Breskens area was known by the 
Germans as "Fortress South Scheldt." It was 
ably defended by the 64th Infantry Division, 
a reconstructed unit that had at its disposal 
a wealth of extra weapons and supplies 
acquired from the retreating German 15th 
Army. In total, German forces in the pocket 
n u m b e r e d 11 ,000 men i n c l u d i n g 
Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe uni ts . The 
Germans were aided in their defence by the 
fact that the Breskens Pocket was essentially 
an island. It was bounded by the North Sea, 
the Braakman Inlet and the Leopold Canal on 
all sides with only a narrow, but heavily 
defended, land bridge in the southeast corner. 
To complicate matters, this was polder country 
(fields below sea level). The Germans could 
mount a very stout defence by defending the 
junctions of the dykes and roads which criss-
crossed the area. Moving across muddy and 
flooded fields proved to be difficult for the 
infantry and impossible for vehicles, even 
those with tracks. Travel on the raised roads 
was tantamount to suicide. Conventional 
infantry attacks could not succeed without 
prohibitive casualties.3 
The terrain of the Breskens Pocket was 
unlike anything the Canadian army had 
encountered and presented a number of 
significant challenges. Major R.G. Hodgins, 
second-in-command of the Highland Light 
Infantry, related that: 
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Canadian carriers move through the wet, muddy, flat ground near Breskens, 28 October 1944. 
Photo by ht. Grant, NAC PA 131252 
Dyke warfare, or "polder-fighting", requires entirely 
new t ac t i c s and poses many p rob lems in 
consequence. Troops had seldom encountered such 
continuous and difficult fighting. Movement is 
restricted to dykes and heights of land are unknown. 
The enemy is afforded excellent opportunity to use 
his many automatic weapons.4 
As a result, operations in the Breskens Pocket 
took on the appearance of siege warfare. The 
German defenders, well armed with automatic 
weapons of various calibre, and with a virtually 
unlimited supply of ammunition, enjoyed a 
decided advan tage over the C a n a d i a n 
attackers. The infantry alone could not 
overcome the defences —they requi red 
substantial support from a variety of sources. 
Flame-throwers, medium machine guns and 
M-10 tank destroyers were all used to good 
effect during the operation, but it was the 
artillery that was most often singled out for 
the support it rendered. The slow-moving 
nature of operations allowed the artillery to 
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prepare fire plans for "every potential source 
of opposition" which were available at very 
short notice through the use of codenames. 
The infantry felt the artillery was used very 
effectively to support their attacks and repulse 
enemy counterattacks.5 However, there was 
one other source of support that was of great 
assistance to the 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division in helping them clear the pocket: 
close air support.6 
By October 1944, a sophisticated system for arranging air support had developed 
between the British Army and the Royal Air 
Force. The genesis for this organization 
developed out of the planning for the invasion 
of Europe. It was recognized that the army 
and air force would need to form a close 
working relationship to ensure success. As a 
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result, Second Tactical Air Force was formed 
to work with 21 Army Group. At the core of 
2nd TAF was the composite group, a powerful 
formation composed of fighters, fighter-
bombers and rocket-firing Typhoons. It was 
designed to accomplish a multitude of roles 
crucial to the army including the maintenance 
of air superiority, the conduct of armed, 
photographic and tactical reconnaissance 
sorties, artillery spotting as well as close and 
direct support missions.7 Two composite 
groups were formed; 83 Group which worked 
with Second British Army and 84 Group 
which was paired with First Canadian Army. 
Formed in June 1943, 84 Group remained 
under the operational control of 83 Group 
until mid-August 1944. During this time the 
majority of its missions involved fighter sweeps 
and armed reconnaissance. It was not until 
12 August that 84 Group became a fully 
operational, and independent, command. 
From that point, 84 Group and First Canadian 
Army formed a close relationship that endured 
until the end of the war. In many ways, 84 
Group has never received the attention it 
deserves. British historians have been most 
interested in 83 Group due to its pairing with 
Second British Army and the primacy of their 
role during the battle of Normandy. Canadians 
have also concentrated on 83 Group due to 
A rocket-firing Typhoon of the Second Tactical Air Force warming up for a mission. 
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Major-General Dan Spry (right) talks with Field Mar-
shal Montgomery at 3rd Canadian Infantry Division 
Headquarters on 24 October 1944. 
Photo by H.A. Barnett, NAC PA 142115 
the fact that half its squadrons were supplied 
by the RCAF. The fact that 84 Group worked 
largely with First Canadian Army and was 
thus engaged in operations away from the 
"spotlight" has contributed to the minimal 
attention paid to 84 Group. 
A unique aspect of the First Canadian 
Army-84 Group partnership was the co-
location of their respective headquarters. This 
enabled the air support request system to be 
substantially streamlined due to the physical 
proximity of the two staffs. It was here, in the 
Joint Battle Room and Army Operations Room 
that all decisions affecting operations were 
made. This control centre acted as the 
dissemination point for all information going 
to the various Wings and Corps under the 
Joint HQ. Decisions concerning the missions 
to be flown the next day were made at the 
Evening Joint Conference held daily between 
senior representa t ives of each service. 
Requests for air support originated from the 
various staff sections at headquarters First 
Canadian Army. In addition to this pre-
arranged support, requests which originated 
at the battalion and brigade levels were 
forwarded by the Air Support Signals Units 
(ASSU) and the Forward Control Posts (FCP) 
located nea r the front.8 Under ideal 
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conditions, this support could be requested 
and delivered in as little as 15 minutes through 
the ASSU and FCP nets. In such a case the 
requests would be sent directly from the 
forward lines to aircraft orbiting over the 
battlefield, bypassing the joint headquarters. 
This system had received constant fine tuning 
since its baptism of fire in June . By the fall 
of 1944 the system was operating most 
efficiently.9 
Shortly after the conclusion of "Switch-back," Major-General D.C. Spry, General 
Officer Commanding 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division, wrote a report examining air support 
in the operation. Spry began by stating, "The 
co-operation and effective support rendered 
by the Air Force contributed greatly to the fall 
of the Breskens pocket. 3 Canadian Infantry 
Division received the maximum air support 
during this period and except when weather 
conditions made flying impossible, allied 
planes were constantly overhead."10 
According to Spry, the direct results of the 
air support were quite substantial. Towns 
such as Breskens, Ijzendijke, and Oostburg 
were destroyed largely by air attack. R/P 
Typhoons were responsible for the destruction 
of enemy HQs, forward artillery batteries, 
observation posts, and various other defensive 
positions. In particular, the fighter-bombers 
were quite successful in their attacks on Fort 
Frederik Hendrik and the heavy artillery that 
was shelling the Breskens area from across 
the S c h e l d t in F l u s h i n g . Tac t i ca l 
reconnaissance had been very successful in 
providing the Army with information on enemy 
movements and concentrations. The German 
communication system was severely harassed 
by air a t t a c k s , in p a r t i c u l a r t h r o u g h 
"Winkles".11 Air support was also responsible 
for the breakdown of enemy morale and the 
raising of Canadian morale. As Spry said, 
"The visible results are perhaps of NO greater 
importance than the encouragement given 
our own troops."1 2 In addit ion to the 
reconnaissance and attacks carried out by 84 
Group, the medium bombers of 2 Group and 
the heavies of Bomber Command conducted 
over 500 sorties in support of 3rd Division.13 
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A substantial portion of 84 Group's effort 
for October was committed to Operation 
"Switchback." A total of 9,782 sorties were 
flown during the month by 84 Group. This 
figure includes missions in close support of 
the Army such as pre-arranged and immediate 
support, and artillery reconnaissance; direct 
support such as armed reconnaissance, and 
interdiction; as well as photo reconnaissance, 
fighter sweeps and weather sorties.14 Of 
these missions, a total of 1,653 were flown in 
close support of 3rd Division in the Breskens 
Pocket.15 Almost one-third of those sorties 
were handled by the FCP while a fraction of 
the r e m a i n d e r would also have been 
impromptu missions arranged through the 
ASSU. This shows that 3rd Division had a 
significant amount of air support available to 
it at short notice and were willing to use it.16 
The air suppor t given to 3rd Division 
amounted to 25 per cent of the total sorties 
flown by 84 Group in close support of First 
Canadian Army in October.17 It is important 
to keep in mind that the other divisions of 
First Canad ian Army were involved in 
operations of their own that also required the 
support of 84 Group. 
The amount of air support provided by 84 
Group is quite remarkable considering the 
foul weather that characterized October. On 
12 of the 27 days of Operation "Switchback" 
84 Group was unable to participate due to 
adverse weather conditions. Even on days 
when flying was possible, weather restricted 
operations. Typical weather reports on those 
days showed the commitment of the pilots to 
their assigned tasks: "Low cloud and poor 
visibility made flying and pinpointing difficult 
. . . Weather terrible, between storms pilots 
made valiant attempts to attack targets and 
had some success...Weather was again bad 
but in spite of it air support must go on . . ."18 
Since good weather was such a valuable 
commodity, 84 Group had to take advantage 
when it was available. Twice during the 
month of October they set new records for the 
total number of sorties in a day. These totals 
of over 700 sorties per day even exceeded the 
effort put forth during the closing of the 
Falaise Gap. The effort devoted to 3rd Division 
alone exceeded an average of 100 sorties per 
day during flying weather.19 
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An excellent indication of the role of air 
support during Operation "Switchback" can 
be derived from the battalion war diaries. 
During October there were repeated references 
to aerial attacks. Early in the operation, on 
8 October, when the Canadian Scottish were 
engaged in a fierce struggle to expand their 
small bridgehead, the battalion war diarist 
found cause for optimism. "If a gun position 
st i l l gives us t r o u b l e [after a r t i l l e ry 
coun te rba t t e ry fire] he is a t t acked by 
Typhoons. That makes the gun members 
wish they had no Feuhrer! [sic]"20 On 12 
October the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 
Highlanders (SDGs) reported, "Typhoons 
working in close co-operation, 'dead on,'"21 
while the next day the North Shores launched 
a successful attack in which "The air and 
artillery support was a very great factor."22 In 
addition to the accounts of air support directly 
helping a battalion, the war diaries recorded 
many instances where the battalion watched 
attacks nearby. On 13 October the Queen's 
Own Rifles witnessed a Typhoon attack which 
des t royed two h o u s e s bel ieved to be 
ammunition dumps. Similar instances were 
recorded in the war diaries of the Canadian 
Scottish, Highland Light Infantry, SDGs, 
Regina Rifles, and the North Shore Regiment. 
The frequent mention of air support in the 
battalion war diaries gives an excellent 
i n d i c a t i o n i t s i m p o r t a n c e d u r i n g 
"Switchback." An examination of battalion 
war diaries for other periods during the war 
reveal a dearth of entries on close air support. 
Even during the campaign in Normandy, 
where air support operations received a great 
deal of attention and credit for the Allied 
success, there were few instances when close 
air support was mentioned in battalion war 
diaries. Operations in the Breskens Pocket 
had a number of special features such as the 
flatness of the terrain and the slow, deliberate 
nature of the fighting. These helped to make 
the support more visible to the infantry, but 
in the end, the frequent war diary entries are 
a clear indication of the importance air support 
played in the operation. 
Air suppor t played a major role in 
"Switchback" from the beginning. Right from 
the first assault on 6 October, while 7th 
58 
Brigade was clinging to its foothold over the 
Leopold Canal, 84 Group flew 190 sorties in 
support of the bridgehead. Targets included 
mortar and machine gun positions, troop 
concentrations and buildings in the immediate 
b a t t l e a r ea . In a d d i t i o n , a r m e d 
reconnaissance flights were conducted to 
interdict the flow of reinforcements to the 
front. The Typhoon squadrons of 123 Wing 
were sent a message of congratulations by 
First Canadian Army for their attacks on 
targets immediately in front of the Canadian 
positions.23 
The Operations Record Book of 84 Group 
gives a good description of a typical day's air 
support during Operation "Switchback": 
84 Group aircraft will cause and main ta in 
interdiction at the main centres of movement of 
SCHOONDIKE [sic], SLUIS and OOSTBURG, at the 
same time carrying out Armed Reconnaissance on 
the main roads leading from BRESKENS, CADZAND 
and OOSTBURG. In addition to this, continued 
offensive ac t ion aga in s t known enemy 
concentrations of guns will be carried out; a "free 
lance" squadron will be operated solely against 
mortar and field gun positions on the front of 7 Bde, 
and the V.C.P. will operate "Cabrank" against 
immediate support targets. Heavy bombers of 
Bomber Command have been requested to destroy 
the gun positions East of FLUSHING, which are 
directed against 9 Bde. Bombers of 2 Group have 
been requested to attack known 17 cm gun batteries 
in the area of CADZAND.24 
The value of the air support conducted by 
84 Group can be seen in the outcome of the 
three attacks by the 9th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade during the period 21-25 October. 
The brigade was given the task of capturing 
three of the strongest positions in the Pocket: 
the towns of Breskens and Schoondijke, along 
with Fort Frederik Hendrik.25 The first assault 
was made on 21 October by the SDGs against 
Breskens. The weather that day was typical 
for the operation; overcast with intermittent 
rain showers. The assault was to be well 
supported by the artillery resources of 3rd 
Division, 59th Division, and 9 Army Group 
Royal Artillery (AGRA). As well, medium 
bombers and Typhoons were to strike the 
German batteries across the Scheldt at 
Flushing and 84 Group was to attack Breskens 
and Schoondijke immediately before the 
ground assault. As might be expected, the 
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Artillery shells landing in Breskens, 22 October 1944. Note the Churchill AVKE at the left side of the photo. 
Photo by Donald I. Grant, NAC PA 138437 
assaults on Schoondijke and Fort Frederik 
Hendrik would have to go ahead without air 
support. After Breskens had been secured 
the Highland Light Infantry were sent to 
capture Schoondijke. Along with Breskens, 
Oostburg and Sluis, Schoondijke had become 
an anchor in the enemy's secondary defensive 
line following the 9th Brigade landings. Since 
early October the town had been subjected to 
continuous air at tacks, by both fighter-
bombers and medium bombers. General 
Spry reported that Schoondijke had been 
almost totally destroyed by the combination 
of bombing and artillery.28 The HLI attack on 
the afternoon of 22 October met stiff resistance 
and heavy shelling. This was overcome 
partially through the use of flamethrowers 
and the town was largely secured by nightfall.29 
The first attempt to capture Fort Frederik 
Hendrik was made on the morning of 22 
October by two companies of the North Nova 
Scotia Highlanders supported by artillery and 
medium machine guns. The old fort had been 
heavily pounded by Second TAF and the 
Royal Artillery in the past but the Germans 
had constructed new concrete positions 
inside. Initially the North Novas made good 
progress but they were met by heavy fire 
when troops attempted to infiltrate the outer 
59 
events did not go exactly as planned. A mix-
up between 9th Brigade and 3rd Division 
delayed transmission of the final air plan to 
84 Group. This delay was compounded by 
poor weather and soggy landing grounds at 
the airfields. As a result, the Typhoons began 
their Winkle 25 minutes late. Lieutenant-
Colonel Roger Rowley, commanding officer of 
the SDGs, was quite critical of the initial air 
effort. The battalion war diary recorded his 
belief that the Winkle was a "farce." He had 
expected a greater effort and was disappointed 
when only cannon fire was employed in the 
attack with no use of rockets or bombs. In 
spite of the disappointing start, the war diaries 
of both the SDGs and 9th Brigade record that 
Typhoons, available on immediate call through 
ASSU channels, provided effective support 
throughout the day. By nightfall, the town of 
Breskens, a cornerstone of the German 
defences, had fallen to Canadian troops and 
patrols were beginning to probe Fort Frederik 
Hendrik.26 In total, 84 Group flew 196 sorties 
in support of 3rd Division that day while the 
medium bombers of 2 Group contributed an 
additional 192 sorties.27 
On 22 October, the weather turned nasty 
and flying operations were suspended for the 
next six days. This meant that the planned 
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perimeter of the fort. Because of the stiff 
opposition, the decision was made to withdraw 
and prepare a set piece attack well supported 
by the RAF. Fortunately, before that could 
occur, a deserter from the Fort was captured. 
He was sent back with the message that "the 
whole weight of available resources would be 
brought to bear" on the garrison the following 
morning if they failed to surrender. The 
threat of another major bombardment by the 
joint resources of the RAF and artillery was 
sufficient to spur the remaining Germans to 
su r r ende r . 3 0 These examples give an 
indication of the role that air support can 
play in a battle. The direct effects of air 
support are devastating, but the cumulative 
and psychological effects cannot be easily 
dismissed. Air support was not a miracle 
weapon. It will not turn a defeat into a victory 
or take the place of the infantry but it did help 
to achieve limited objectives at a great saving 
in lives and time. 
As was seen in the case of Fort Frederik 
Hendrik, air power can affect the battlefield 
in an indirect manner. On a number of 
occasions the battalion war diaries recorded 
instances where air attacks led directly to the 
surrender of large numbers of prisoners. The 
impact on-German morale was also noted. In 
one amusing incident, a prisoner captured by 
the SDGs reported that an air attack had 
destroyed his company's field kitchen. This 
particular attack had a serious effect on the 
unit 's morale because, "as a result they get 
cold food as a steady diet."31 On a more 
serious note, the Queen's Own Rifles war 
diarist commented on the effects of the support 
they received: "With the first clear day in a 
Opposite— 
Top: The town of Schoondtjke was one of the corner-
stones of German defences in the Breskens Pocket 
and as such was subjected to repeated air and artil-
lery bombardment. It can be seen from this photo, 
taken on 18 October, that the town was virtually 
levelled. It wasjinally captured by the Highland Light 
Infantry on 22 October. WW Air Photo 22313013 
Bottom, left and right: Fort Frederik Hendrik, on 11 
September, before Operation "Switchback" com-
menced, and on 18 October, four days before itfinally 
fell to the SDGs. 
WLU Air Photo 162/4123 & 223/4031. 
while [28 October], we got lots of air support. 
Typhoons started out early and made things 
pretty hot for Jerry. According to PWs 
[prisoners of war] they are a great morale 
breaker as well as doing a lot of damage." 32 
These effects were also noticed by the RAF. A 
report by 84 Group stated that German 
artillery stopped firing when Allied aircraft 
were in the vicinity. The mere threat of air 
attack was sufficient to put the German guns 
out of action.33 A similar conclusion was 
arrived at in a joint report prepared by the 
operational research sections of Second 
Tactical Air Force and 21 Army Group: 
With the exception of G.A.F. anti-aircraft gunners, 
P. W.s stated that they always took cover immediately 
[when] the Typhoons started to attack and remained 
there for times varying from 1 to 10 minutes 
afterwards; they expected planes to circle round 
and strafe again. It seems that a succession of 
attacks suitably timed have a very great effect on 
morale . . . It has even been found that the very 
presence of our aircraft over the battlefield is 
sufficient to cause the enemy to remain under 
cover.34 
This effect was confirmed du r ing the 
interrogation of the commander of the German 
division in the Pocket. According to the report, 
"General Eberding said that our air support 
had caused him some casualties but that its 
greatest effect was to prevent movement by 
day and limit the activity of his artillery."35 
These are not direct effects of air power but 
spin-offs derived from enemy knowledge of 
the potential power of air attack which is 
backed by a constant presence in the skies. 
Air power was definitely not the decisive 
factor in determining the success of Operation 
"Switchback." No amount of air support 
could replace the job of the common soldier 
who had to fight his way from dike to dike 
across each succeeding polder. What air 
power did accomplish, however, was to make 
that job somewhat easier. Major-General 
Spry credited air operations with bringing 
Opera t ion "Swi tchback" to a qu i cke r 
conclusion by materially assisting in the 
victory.36 In this sense, the support rendered 
to 3rd Division was crucial to the success of 
the operation because the quicker the Scheldt 
was cleared, the sooner the port of Antwerp 
could open and the faster the war would end. 
61 
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